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Mixing Metaphors in the Hemispheres

Abstract
Are processes of figurative comparison and figurative categorization different?
An experiment combining alternative-sense and matched-sense metaphor
priming with a divided visual field assessment technique sought to isolate
processes of comparison and categorization in the two cerebral hemispheres.
For target metaphors presented in the RVF/LH, only matched-sense primes were
facilitative. Literal primes and alternative-sense primes had no effect on
comprehension time compared to the unprimed baseline. The effects of
matched-sense primes were additive with the rated conventionality of the
targets. For target metaphors presented to the LVF/RH, matched-sense primes
were again additively facilitative. However, alternative-sense primes, though
facilitative overall, seemed to eliminate the pre-existing advantages of
conventional target metaphor senses in the LVF/RH in favor of metaphoric
senses similar to those of the primes. These findings are consistent with tightly
controlled categorical coding in the LH and coarse, and flexible, context
dependent coding in the RH.
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Some metaphors are more familiar than others. These differences affect
the intuitive difficulty with which a metaphor is comprehended. Compare for
example the transparency of the very common, or conventional, metaphor (a)
“That student is a star”, with the relatively unusual (b) “An insult is a razor.”
Sentence (a) may fail to even register as metaphorical without conscious
reflection, whereas (b) seems to require some effort for interpretation. Several
prominent theories suggest that the degree of familiarity alters the cognitive
processes underlying metaphoric language comprehension (Bowdle & Gentner
2005; Giora 1997). For instance, according to the Career of Metaphor model of
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) conventional metaphorical terms are processed
essentially as if they are established categories, whereas relatively novel
metaphors are more likely to involve analogical comparison (e.g., structural
alignment, Gentner & Wolff, 1997). Consider the following novel metaphoric
sentence with “spider” as the topic and “fisherman” as the metaphor vehicle: “A
spider is a fisherman.” According to Bowdle and Gentner, its interpretation
involves aligning salient properties of “fisherman,” and relationships among
those properties, and projecting them onto “spider.”
For such novel metaphors, there are multiple potential structural
relationships that can be projected onto the target. Does the speaker intend to
evoke the lonely patience of the fisherman waiting for a tug on his line, or are
we meant to notice that the spider’s web is a net that is cast for protein-rich life
forms that travel through air rather than water? Both kinds of structural
similarities might be relevant. If the context preceding this metaphoric sentence
had emphasized the idea of hunting, then we should probably construe the
invocation of the fisherman as hunter. If the preceding context had invoked the
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solitary nature of the spider’s existence, however, then the metaphor vehicle
might be intended to invoke the patient vigilance of a fisherman waiting for a
tug on his line. Moreover, if the topic of the metaphoric sentence is changed
altogether, as in “A salesman is a fisherman,” some other concepts (like “bait” or
“lure”) might be more likely to be activated in understanding the intended
metaphoric sense of fisherman than would be the case when the topic was
“spider.”
Because of this ambiguity of intended sense, novel metaphors pose
different processing challenges for a listener than conventional metaphors, but
can also offer communicative advantages to a speaker. On the one hand,
whereas a conventional metaphor (e.g., “reeling [someone] in”) has a salient,
precise and restricted sense that, arguably, needs to be recognized rather than
constructed, comprehension of a novel metaphor may sometimes require
searching a fairly large semantic field in order to find the appropriate bases for
structural alignment with the metaphor’s topic. Thus, the granularity of the
representational systems most useful for analyzing novel and conventional
metaphors might be quite different. On the other hand, the representational
power of using novel extensions of speech, including extended metaphors,
requires a flexible representational system that can adapt itself to changing
semantic alignments in different contexts. The flexibility that is required for
novel and extended metaphors contrasts with pressure for established
conventional uses to remain fixed. As a result, we might anticipate that the
processes involved in interpreting novel metaphors would be more sensitive to
the immediate context than would the processes involved in interpreting
conventional metaphors.
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From the standpoint of cognitive efficiency, repeated exposure to a
particular novel metaphor ought to constrain its interpretation. Bowdle and
Gentner (2005) report evidence supporting this view. Exposing participants to a
few instances of sentences instantiating a similar sense of the novel metaphor
vehicle was sufficient to partially conventionalize that metaphoric sense so that
it was processed more like a common metaphor as assessed by a variety of
behavioral measures. They describe the natural conventionalization of a
metaphor in language as its “career.” Thibodeau and Durgin (2009; in press)
provide further support for this view by showing that rapid (experimental)
“conventionalization” applies to a very specific metaphoric sense of a metaphor
vehicle rather than being a property of the vehicle per se or of its metaphoricity.
They showed that novel metaphoric sentences were comprehended more
quickly and rated as more apt when there had been exposure during a
preceding experimental task to metaphoric sentences using the same vehicle
with a similar metaphoric sense rather than an alternative metaphoric sense.
This result points to the importance of distinguishing between the
conventionality of a metaphoric sentence (i.e., “A spider is a fisherman.”) and
the conventionality of the specific metaphoric senses (e.g., solitary vigilance,
hunter by net) that the metaphor vehicle takes on in different contexts.
The Career of Metaphor hypothesis emphasizes the idea that novel
metaphors may be processed quite differently than conventional ones (see also
Giora, 1997, 1999), but it is important to note that several candidate processes
may underlie the comprehension of novel metaphors. These could include
structural alignment processes (Bowdle & Genter 2005; Gentner & Markman,
1997), dynamic category formation (Barsalou, 1987; Glucksberg & Keysar,
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1990), or other forms of constraint satisfaction involved in relational reasoning
(Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003). We will refer to all of these kinds of
processes as comparison processes. The use of this terminology is intended to
contrast a general class of processes that might be used to develop or establish
a particular metaphoric sense for a novel metaphor with categorization
processes involved in accessing or invoking an already-established sense for a
more conventional metaphor.
One way to try to isolate what is distinct about these two kinds of general
processes (comparison and categorization) is to take advantage of recent
evidence concerning lateralization of neural function. Whereas it had formerly
been suggested that the right hemisphere may have a special role to play in the
interpretation of figurative language generally, recent evidence has tended to
contradict this view and to suggest instead that right hemisphere involvement
may be better characterized along the axis of novelty, non-salience, remoteness,
or unpredictability rather than metaphoricity per se (Coulson, 2008; Coulson &
van Petten, 2007; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999; Giora & Stringaris, 2009; Kacinik &
Chiarello, 2007; Mashal & Faust, 2009; Mashal, Faust, Hendler & Jung-Beeman,
2007; Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd & Kircher, 2007; Schmidt, DeBuse & Seger, 2007;
Schmidt, Kranjec, Cardillo & Chatterjee, 2009). In particular, Jung-Beeman’s
(2005) coarse-coding hypothesis suggests that the right hemisphere provides
greater overlap of activation between semantically remote concepts, and may
thus provide the basis for processes of structural alignment necessary for
analogical reasoning and the interpretation of novel or remote metaphoric
comparisons. Indeed, several researchers have recently noted a correspondence
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between theories of lateralization and the Career of Metaphor hypothesis (e.g.,
Mashal & Faust, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2009).
Mashal and Faust (2009) sought to demonstrate the correspondence
between the lateralization theories and the cognitive processing theories by
using a divided visual field paradigm (Burgess & Simpson 1988, see Banich
2003 for a review). They examined comprehension speed for figuratively
related word pairs presented where the first word appeared centrally and the
second appeared laterally (to the left or right). They found that novel
metaphoric pairs were processed more slowly when presented to the right visual
field / left cerebral hemisphere (RVF/LH) than when presented to the LVF/RH,
but that this pattern was reversed when the metaphors were repeated in a
second session. They argued that LH involvement increased because repetition
conventionalized the metaphor so it was more likely to be processed by
categorization. Although a skeptic may reasonably point out that mere
familiarity (Schmidt, DeBuse & Seger, 2007) or predictability (Federmeier, 2007;
Kandhadai & Federmeier, 2007) of the repeated figurative items is sufficient to
explain speeded LH processing in the second session, this type of facilitation
was not observed for non-metaphorically related pairs of words in Mashal and
Faust’s paradigm.
Mashal and Faust’s (2009) study seems to confirm the idea that left
hemisphere-specialized, categorical processing will occur for repeated figurative
items. However, it does not address the role of the right hemisphere in the
processing of novel metaphors. Indeed, because the same topics were employed
with the same metaphors, it did not clarify whether it was a specific metaphoric
sense rather than the metaphor-topic relationship that was gaining benefits
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from familiarization. In the present study we sought to use the functional
differentiation of the left and right hemispheric pathways to further investigate
metaphor processing using a divided visual field paradigm. The effects of
vehicle repetition were investigated in each hemisphere for both novel and
conventional metaphor vehicles, but we also manipulated whether the vehicles
used to prime the target sentence had the same metaphoric sense as the target
or an alternative metaphoric sense.
To do this we used a variant of the “in vitro conventionalization”
paradigm developed by Bowdle and Gentner (2005) for novel metaphors. In their
paradigm, participants were shown pairs of novel figurative statements such as
“a ballerina is (like) a butterfly” and “a gymnast is (like) a butterfly”. Participants
were then asked to generate a third example using the same vehicle (butterfly).
When later asked to evaluate yet a fourth instance using this same vehicle,
participants who had been exposed to the earlier instances, were more likely to
accept a metaphorical form (“an acrobat is a butterfly”) as preferable to a simile
form (“an acrobat is like a butterfly”) than were participants who had not been
exposed to the prior instances (the effect was the same whether the prior
instances had been in metaphor or simile form). A similar (though more
extreme) pattern of metaphor-form preference was observed for highly
conventional metaphors even without any experimental pre-exposure. Bowdle
and Gentner consider that the shift in preference from simile form to metaphor
form reflected the transition from comparison processes toward
conventionalized categorization.
Because we were interested not only in the transition from comparison to
categorization, but also in the granularity and flexibility of the categorization
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and comparison processes themselves, we developed a similar paradigm based
on the approach of Thibodeau and Durgin (2009, in press). They had
participants simply rate a variety of metaphor primes for “metaphoricity” and
then measured ratings of “aptness” as well as comprehension time for later
instances that used the previously presented metaphor vehicles. Crucially, as an
additional experimental condition they developed additional prime sentences
that expressed alternative senses of the same metaphor vehicle. For example,
the metaphoric sense of razor in “Betrayal is a razor” is quite different from the
metaphoric sense of razor in “A genius’ mind is a razor”, and the metaphoric
sense of the vehicle in the first sentence is rated as having a much more similar
sense to the metaphorical sense of the vehicle in “An insult is a razor” than was
the metaphoric sense of the vehicle in the second sentence1. Their study showed
that prior exposure to a matched metaphoric sense was effective at increasing
later ratings of aptness and in decreasing measures of comprehension time in
comparison to literal primes. In contrast, exposure to prime sentences that
instantiated an alternative metaphoric sense did not facilitate comprehension.
Indeed, aptness ratings for target metaphor sentences were actually lowered
when primes were alternative-sense uses of the same metaphor vehicle in the
first part of the experiment. Thus, in the terminology of the Career of Metaphor
hypothesis, it appeared that advancing the career of one metaphoric sense of a
word might interfere with the career of another sense.

1

In ratings of the similarity of metaphoric sense of the vehicle “razor” in “Insult is a razor” and

these other two sentences (on a 1-7 scale), metaphoric sense-similarity was reliably higher for
“Betrayal is a razor “ (6.35) than for “A genius’s mind is a razor.” (3.17), t(30) = 6.05, p < .0001.
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By using a divided visual field paradigm and using competing metaphoric
senses of a metaphor vehicle as primes in some cases and consistent
metaphoric senses in others, we hoped to elucidate the granularity and context
dependency of metaphor processing in the two hemispheres. If the right
hemisphere’s role in novel metaphor comprehension is primarily to aid with
comparison processes by activating a coarse network of associated semantic
features, it might turn out that prior activation of one metaphoric sense would
still provide processing benefits for others. In contrast, for the LH, we should
expect no benefit (and perhaps even a cost) from prior activation of an
alternative metaphoric sense. This is because a category formed by
conventionalizing one sense cannot be applied to an alternative sense. Thus
conventionalization of an alternative sense should not facilitate LH processing
for a targeted, but unprimed sense.
A second, subtler, prediction also follows from our lateralized
interpretation of the Career of Metaphor hypothesis. Recall that RH comparison
processes may need to flexibly accommodate novel metaphors so as to support
extended metaphors, whereas LH categorization processes may rely on salient
or conventional senses. If so, then the overall conventionality of a given
metaphoric sense ought to have a stable role in LH metaphor processing, but
things might be very different for RH metaphor processing. Primes that
instantiate an alternative metaphoric sense of a target metaphor vehicle might
induce a re-ordering of the salience of relevant structural alignments available in
the RH. Such a realignment could impact the processing of the target sense
dramatically. In particular, a re-ordering of salient alignments in the RH to
accommodate a previously-presented alternative sense could reduce or
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eliminate the normal processing advantages due to the long-term
conventionality of the target sense. This differentiation between the possible
effects of mixing metaphors (using a different metaphoric sense as prime than
as target) on the two hemispheres may help explain why on-line comprehension
time for target sentences was unaffected by alternative sense primes, even
though aptness ratings were depressed (Thibodeau & Durgin, in press). Whereas
comprehension time depends on arriving at a solution (categorization), making
judgments of “aptness” may invite a more nuanced consideration of how
satisfying that solution is (comparison).

Table 1. Example stimuli for target vehicle “razor”
Target Sentence

An insult is a razor

Matched-Sense Primes

A betrayal is a razor.
Needless criticism is a razor.

Alternative-Sense Primes

A genius’ mind is a razor.
Her memory is a razor.

Literal Primes

A scalpel is a razor.
Gillette shavers are razors.

We adapted our stimuli from prior studies (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2009, in
press), involving three types of paired prime sentences: matched-sense primes,
which used the target metaphor vehicle in the same sense as the target, literal
primes, which used the target vehicle in a literal sense, and alternative-sense
primes, which used the target vehicle in a different metaphoric sense than did
the target sentence (see Table 1). Stimuli were constructed so that the
conventionality of the vehicles used in targets varied substantially in order to
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investigate how the familiarity of a metaphorical sense might interact with the
different prime types. Whereas primes were presented centrally during an RSVP
(rapid serial visual presentation) reading task, target metaphor vehicles were
presented to either the right or left visual field to test for interactions between
metaphor conventionality and prime-type across hemispheres.

Method
Participants
Sixty-four Swarthmore college undergraduates participated in the study
for payment or course credit for participation. All were native speakers of
English, self-reported as right-handed, and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Task
Participants wore an eye-tracker while reading sentences presented one
word at a time (for 200 ms) at fixation. At the conclusion of each sentence,
participants indicated if the sentence made sense. The final word in some of the
sentences (including all the target metaphor vehicles) was presented to the left
or right of fixation, but participants were instructed to maintain fixation at the
center of the screen throughout. These peripheral words were left up for 300
ms or until participants’ gaze was not within a small distance (1.9°) of fixation.
Stimuli
The full set of experimental stimuli are shown in Appendix A along with
ratings of conventionality and similarity of sense. The stimuli were adapted with
several modifications from the studies by Thibodeau and Durgin (2009, in
press). Each of the 32 nominal metaphor target sentences ended with a single-
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word vehicle. The 192 associated prime sentences had the same structure, as
did the 208 filler sentences (see Appendix B).
Conventionality ratings for target metaphor sentences were obtained by
surveying 20 additional participants, who did not take part in the main study.
Half these participants were asked to rate how “familiar” the metaphoric sense
of the vehicle was and half were asked to rate how “unusual” it was. Both ratings
were on a 7-point scale. Conventionality was then computed as the averaged
difference between the two ratings and converted to z-scores. Normalized
conventionality ratings are included in Appendix A. The same procedure was
used with an additional 32 participants to assess the conventionality of the
metaphoric sense for the alternative-sense and matched-sense prime sentences
(presented as a pair; condition was varied within subjects, but between subjects
by item). These ratings are also included in Appendix A.
Similarity of Sense ratings were used to test whether vehicles in the
target metaphor sentences were judged more similar in sense to those in the
matched-sense metaphors than to those in the alternative-sense metaphors.
After the completion of the main experiment, 32 additional participants were
presented with pairs of either alternative-sense or matched-sense prime
sentences (condition was varied within subjects, but between subjects by item)
along with the relevant target sentence and asked to rate either how “similar” or
how “different” the metaphoric sense of the metaphor vehicle was in the target
sentence compared with the other two (on a 7-point scale). “Different” ratings
were reverse-coded and combined with “similar” ratings by item; means are
reported in Appendix A. The mean overall difference between matched-sense
and alternative-sense primes was 1.92 points on this scale, t(31) = 8.46, p <
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.0001. There were two items that trended in the wrong direction (“donkey” and
“fossil”), though not reliably so. Elimination of these two items in later analyses
did not affect any statistical conclusions, so they were included in the reported
analyses.
Design
Targets were presented laterally in either visual field (RVF, LVF), and were
preceded (not immediately) by four prime conditions (match, literal, mix, none),
for a total of eight conditions for each target. Two priming sentences were used
for each target item in each primed condition. Each participant was assigned to
one of 8 target lists, each of which contained all 32 targets, and each target was
assigned to a condition once across all 8 lists, so that a list contained 4 targets
in each condition. Target order was shuffled, but all 8 conditions were cycled
through before any condition was repeated, and appropriate primes were added
immediately before their targets to form a critical sentence list with 80 entries.
These were then combined with 208 filler sentences to form the actual
sequence of 288 trials. (A practice block of 36 additional items preceded the
main experiment.)
The trials were subdivided into 8 sub blocks of 36 sentences, each
containing 26 filler sentences and 10 critical sentences (4 targets, one in each
prime condition, and 6 associated primes). Sub block order was randomized
between subjects. Within each sub block, critical sentences were always
separated by 2 or 3 filler sentences. To ensure that subjects did not use vehicle
repetition or metaphoricity as a response cue, multiple filler sentences used
repeated final words, distributed across metaphoric, literal, and nonsensical
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senses; in addition, one third of fillers used peripheral presentation of the final
word of the sentence.

Figure 1. Schematic illustration of interleaving of prime sentences with fillers (left) and of an RSVP
trial (right) with lateralized presentation of the metaphor vehicle. One third of filler sentences
were lateralized. A light blue fixation crosshair was visible throughout each trial.

The specific composition of fillers in each sub block included 11 different
vehicles: Two vehicles were used four times (twice metaphorically and twice
nonsensically or twice literally and twice nonsensically). Three vehicles were
used three times (one was once each of literal, metaphorical and nonsensical;
the second was used twice nonsensically and once metaphorically; the third was
used twice nonsensically and once literally). Three vehicles were used twice (one
nonsensical and literal; one literal and metaphoric; one metaphoric and
nonsensical). Finally, three filler vehicles in each sub block were used only one
time, one as nonsense, one literal, and one metaphoric. In all, 12 filler
sentences in each sub block were nonsensical (33% of trials). Prime vehicles
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were always presented centrally, but filler sentence-final words were assigned
randomly with equal weight to left, central, or right visual field presentation,
with the result that, overall, 30% of sentence-final words were presented to the
left, 40% at the center, and 30% to the right. The full stimulus list (not including
the practice block) was thus 288 sentences, a third of which were intended to be
nonsense, and which were designed to prevent recognition of critical sentences
by either metaphoricity, laterality, or vehicle repetition.
Procedure
We measured participants’ response latency for ‘sense’ judgments using
a go/no-go design. Participants were instructed to judge a sentence as making
‘sense’ if a sentence had a clear metaphoric or literal meaning, even if the use
of certain words were unfamiliar. Participants were instructed not to consider
whether they agreed with the statement in making ‘sense judgments’. The
following example was used to illustrate ‘sense’ for participants: ‘My brother is
a pain’ has a familiar sense; ‘my brother is an itch’ is not a familiar usage of
‘itch’, but there’s a fairly straightforward interpretation; ‘my brother is a table’
has no familiar meaning, and to construct an interpretation would require
extensive elaboration and interpretation. Recognizing that ‘sense’ is not black
and white, participants were instructed to note the contrast between ‘my
brother is an itch’ and ‘my brother is a table’ in evaluating the sense of
sentences they read.
Each trial consisted of an RSVP sentence, followed by a ‘sense’ judgment
period of 2 seconds. If a positive ‘sense’ judgment was not made within this
period, the judgment was recorded as negative. Participants made positive
‘sense’ judgments by pressing the ‘A’ button on a gamepad controller resting
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on a surface between them and the monitor, using their right index finger.
Words were presented one-by-one, for 200ms each, except for sentence final
words which were always presented for 300ms, to facilitate comprehension
when presented laterally.
To familiarize participants with task structure, speed, and sense
judgments, participants began the experiment with a practice block of 36
sentences, mirroring the composition of filler and critical sentences in the
experimental sub blocks. On practice sentences only, immediate feedback on
sense judgments was given, by presenting ‘Correct’ in green or ‘Wrong’ in red
text in an effort to calibrate the participant’s threshold.
Apparatus and display parameters
The experiment was run using Psychtoolbox-3 (Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli,
2007; http://psychtoolbox.org) running on Matlab 7.6.0 (Mathworks, Nantucket,
Massachusetts). Participants sat with their head in a chin-rest, positioned 49 cm
from a 17 inch-diagonal flatscreen CRT monitor with a resolution of 1024 x 768
at 100 Hz. An Eyelink II eye-tracker was used to monitor fixation at 250 Hz. Each
trial began with a small blue cross hair, presented in the center of the screen
against a black background. Words were then presented in white Helvetica font,
size 42, either centered on the cross hair, or to the left or right of the cross,
with the inner edge of the word 100 pixels (3.8°) from fixation. These
dimensions were selected to accommodate the demands of monitoring fixation
with reasonable precision. The font size was large enough to be legible at this
eccentricity.
Many divided visual field studies present lateralized words for no longer
than 200 ms, approximately the time it takes to plan and perform a saccade
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(e.g., Chiarello, Liu, Shears, Quan & Kacinik, 2003; Matin, Shao & Boff, 1993). To
present sentence-final words for a longer duration (300 ms) while ensuring that
laterally presented words were not fixated, we replaced the lateral word with a
string of ‘#’ symbols whenever fixation was not within 50 pixels (1.9°) of the
center of the display.
Results
Analyses reported here were conducted with linear mixed effects
regression (see Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008) using the lme4 package (Bates
& Maechler, 2009) for the statistical language R (R Core Development Team,
2009). Linear mixed-effects models were used to analyze the response latency
(RT) data for trials where a positive sense response was given. Mean positive
sense response rate (accuracy) for experimental trials over all subjects was 76%
(74% in the LVF/RH and 78% in the RVF/LH). Mean positive sense response rate
was 80% for primes (always central) and 83% for fillers (each of these categories
include literal sentences). The overall false-alarm rate for nonsense fillers (an
interpretation can be found for almost any sentence with sufficient effort) was
only 21%. Unfortunately, lateralization information about the false alarms for
the fillers was not retained due to a programming oversight. A total of 1555
observations were included in our analyses, 758 in the LVF/RH.
Interaction between Visual Field, Prime Type and Conventionality
In an initial analysis, testing for a predicted three-way interaction, Visual
Field (VF: RVF/LH, LVF/RH) and Prime (None, Matched-Sense, Literal, or
Alternative-Sense) were included as categorical factors, and target vehicle
Conventionality was included as a continuous predictor. Subject and Item were
included as random effects. To ensure that the analyses were not
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anticonservative (Levy, forthcoming), and to account for differences in fixed
effects among individual subjects and items, the model specification included
random slopes for the main effects as well as random intercepts. Additionally,
log word frequency (based on SUBTLEXUS; Brysbaert & New, 2009) was included
as a covariate. Because a histogram of sense judgment RTs appeared rightskewed, we used the log transform of RT as the dependent variable in this initial
analysis. We used the no-prime condition as the baseline. We expected primes
to have different effects on targets in the RVF/LH and LVF/RH as a function of
Conventionality. Indeed, a model including all two and three-way interactions
between Conventionality, Prime, and VF explained more variance than when only
the two-way interactions were included, χ2(3)= 10.42, p = .0153. Specifically, the
interaction between Conventionality and the effect of Alternative-Sense Primes
relative to the None condition, differed as a function of VF (i.e., hemisphere), t =
2.71, p = .0065. We therefore split the data by VF for further analysis.
Right Visual Field/Left Hemisphere
Because models using log-transformed and untransformed RTs revealed
the same effects, and because effects in the separate VF analyses were generally
strong, we will report analyses of untransformed RT values hereafter for easier
interpretation of the magnitude of effects. For RVF/LH target vehicle
presentation, a model including two-way interactions between Conventionality
and Prime and modeling Random Effect slopes as well as intercepts explained
no more variance than a simpler model including no interactions, χ2(15) = 10.4,
p > .20. The inclusion of Random Effects slopes did not improve the model.
There was a main effect of Conventionality (-180 ms/SD, p < .0001), as
expected. More importantly, the model showed that Matched-Sense Primes
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reliably facilitated target processing (M = -137ms, p = .0001), but Literal (M = 29ms) and Alternative-Sense Primes (M = -26ms) did not (p > .20). Our data thus
supports the inference that, in the RVF/LH, target sentence processing was only
facilitated by priming of the narrow metaphoric sense intended, but was
essentially unaffected by the activation of other senses including literal ones. A
representation of the modeled data for the RVF/LH is shown in the left panel of
Figure 2. These data are consistent with the findings of Thibodeau and Durgin
(2009, in press), who observed, using a rather different paradigm, that
matched-sense primes elevated aptness ratings and speeded comprehension
time, but that alternative-sense primes did not.
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Figure 2. Mean RTs by item as a function of Prime Type and Conventionality for each hemisphere
(RVF/LH on left; LVF/RH on right). Lines are best fits to the full data. Black: unprimed condition;
blue: Matched-sense metaphor condition; red: Alternative-sense metaphor condition; green:
Literal prime condition.

Left Visual Field/Right Hemisphere

21
Mixing Metaphors in the Hemispheres

For LVF/RH target vehicle presentation, a model including two-way
interactions between Conventionality and Prime explained more variance than a
simpler model including no interactions, χ2(3) = 15.5, p = .0014. The inclusion
of Random Effects slopes did not improve the fit of the model. There was a
reliable interaction between Conventionality and the effect of Alternative-Sense
Primes relative to the baseline (t = 3.15, p = ,0017), where increasing
conventionality was correlated with decreased Alternative-Sense Prime
facilitation. As shown by the modeled data in the right panel of Figure 2, one
way of describing the effect of Alternative-Sense Primes is that they essentially
eliminated any effect of target Conventionality. Overall, all Prime types
decreased target RT relative to the baseline condition (Literal: M = -87 ms, p =
.0120; Alternative-Sense: M = -109 ms, p = .0016; Matched-Sense: M = -183 ms,
p < .0001).
Recall that in the RVF/LH, there was no reliable priming except for
Matched-Sense Primes. Because word reading is generally more difficult in the
LVF/RH, it is possible that some effects of the Prime conditions (e.g., of the
literal Primes) were merely due to word repetition, rather than semantic effects.
To control for lexical priming, we can use the Literal Prime condition as a
baseline. When the two metaphoric prime conditions were compared to the
Literal condition (eliminating the non-primed condition from the analysis), there
was no reliable effect of the Alternative-Sense Primes (M = -26 ms, t < 1, p >
.20), but Matched-Sense Primes still showed reliable facilitation (M = -99 ms, t =
3.28, p = .0011). However, the interaction between Alternative-Sense Prime
effects (relative to the Literal condition) and Conventionality was still highly
reliable (t = 3.54, p = .0004).
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The lack of difference between the Literal and Alternative-Sense prime
conditions overall might be construed as indicating that facilitation in both,
relative to the baseline condition, were due to effects of lexical repetition.
However, it must be borne in mind that no such lexical repetition effects were
found in the RVF/LH, and that the overall difference in response time between
targets presented to the two VFs was only about 100 ms in the present
experiment. It is therefore equally possible that partial semantic activation in
the right hemisphere was responsible for facilitation from both Literal and
Alternative-Sense Prime types.
Figure 2 (right panel) suggests that, relative to Literal Primes,
Alternative-Sense Primes produced robust facilitation for targets of low
conventionality (equivalent to the facilitation produced by Matched-Sense
Primes), but costs for targets of high conventionality. Such costs are consistent
with inhibition of the intended sense of the metaphor vehicle by the alternative
sense of the primes (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson & Werner, 2001). However,
another way of construing the data is to note that Alternative-Sense primes
facilitate nearly all target metaphors relative to the unprimed baseline, but the
facilitation they provide is orthogonal to the conventionality of the target
metaphor. Thus, rather than being additive with effects of target sentence
conventionality (like Matched-Sense or Literal prime conditions) the effect of
experimental exposure to the alternative metaphoric sense of the target
metaphor vehicle is to cancel out any advantage accrued by the existing
conventionality of that vehicle. In essence, the repetition of the mismatched
metaphor primes may (temporarily) eliminate the influence of the
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conventionality of the target by reorienting the flexible RH to favor an
alternative alignment.

1.2
1.0
0.8
0.4

0.6

Mean Response Latency (s)

1.4

1.6

Alternative-Sense Prime Effects in the LVF/RH

-2
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1

2

Target/Prime Sense Similarity (z)

Figure 3. When Alternative-Sense primes had been presented, response latencies for metaphor
vehicles presented to the LVF/RH were best predicted by the rated similarity between the
metaphoric senses of the primes and the target sentence.

We can test this latter hypothesis by using the item-wise Sense-Similarity
rating data (between target sentences and their alternative-sense prime
sentences) to try to predict response latencies in the Alternative-Sense prime
condition of the LVF/RH. We started with a full predictive mixed-effects linear
model including z-scores of Prime-Target Sense Similarity, Target Sense
Conventionality, Prime Sense Conventionality, and log Word Frequency
(SUBTLEXUS), and all 2-way interactions between them. In the full model,
response latency was reliably predicted by Prime-Target Sense Similarity alone (179 ms/SD, t = 2.95, p = .0036). When all other factors were eliminated serially
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with successive model comparisons, it was finally concluded that a model that
included only Prime-Target Sense Similarity was no worse than the full model
(X2(9) = 11.7, p = .2322). This univariate model, shown in Figure 3, indicated a
reliable effect of Sense Similarity in the RH (-76 ms/SD, t = 2.85, p = .0012).
Thus, after priming with alternative sense of the vehicle metaphor, the rated
conventionality of the target sense was no longer robustly predictive of
comprehension time. Instead, the local context, defined by the similarity
between the target metaphor sense and the prime metaphor sense predicted
the speed of comprehension. This provides additional evidence that RH
facilitation in this condition is not due to word repetition but to the repetition of
a specific structural alignment. Moreover the elimination of a target
conventionality effect indicates that alignments in the RH can be flexibly
modified in a manner appropriate to the use of extended metaphor.
In contrast, when a corresponding analysis was carried out for the
Alternative-Sense prime condition in the RVF/LH, it collapsed to a univariate
model with target conventionality as the sole reliable factor, (-150 ms/SD, t =
2.60, p = .0101). Although there was also a marginal trend for prime/target
sense similarity to predict response time when added to the model for the
RVF/LH data, (-60 ms/SD, t = 1.79, p = .0749), this is consistent with other
evidence that matched-sense primes provided an additive benefit to
(categorical) LH processing.

Discussion
In the present experiment we used an experimental conventionalization
procedure to familiarize participants with a specific sense of a metaphor vehicle.
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Using lateral presentation of metaphor vehicles, we showed evidence of
facilitation in both hemispheres as a consequence of such conventionalization
when the tested metaphor had the same metaphorical sense as the metaphor
primes. This facilitation was additive with effects of the baseline conventionality
of the target metaphor sentence and seems to correspond to strengthening of
the categorical representation of the metaphoric sense, as proposed by Bowdle
and Gentner (2005). However, the effects of literal and alternative-sense
metaphor primes were quite different in the two hemispheres and reinforce the
idea that there are differences in coding granularity and coding flexibility in the
two.
As expected based on categorization (access) processes, metaphor
vehicles presented to the RVF/LH were not benefited by primes that used the
vehicle literally or in an alternative metaphorical sense. However, for metaphor
vehicles presented in the LVF/RH, both kinds of alternative primes showed
evidence of facilitating metaphor processing. Facilitation by literal primes
presented to the LVF/RH was additive with sentence conventionality effects,
suggesting a non-competitive activation of related conceptual material useful
for processes of structural alignment. Facilitation by LVF/RH primes that
activated an alternative metaphoric sense, however, eliminated the effect of
sentence conventionality. Instead, comprehension times, following alternative
sense primes, were predicted by the rated similarity of the metaphoric senses of
the prime sentences and the target sentence. This suggests that the alternative
sense established a new comparison context, consistent with a flexible
processor model.
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An alternative view might appeal to inhibitory processes. For example, for
metaphoric senses that were rated to be unfamiliar or unusual, prior activation
of alternative senses facilitated metaphor comprehension as much as did
priming of the same sense. In contrast, for metaphorical vehicles that were
rated as highly familiar, priming of an alternative metaphorical sense provided
less facilitation for metaphor processing compared to primes where the vehicle
was used literally, for example. However, it is not clear that literal priming is
the right baseline. Gernsbacher et al., (2001) argued that processing nominal
metaphors caused irrelevant features of the vehicle to be actively suppressed.
Thus, for example, following the presentation of “My lawyer is a shark,”
decisions about the truth of a literal sentence that referred to an irrelevant
feature of the metaphor vehicle (like “A shark is a good swimmer.”) were
delayed compared to the case where the prior sentence was a literal
categorization statement (like “A hammerhead is a shark”). Decisions about
relevant features (“Sharks are tenacious.”) were facilitated. However, these
results are also consistent with differential facilitation rather than inhibition,
and it seems relevant in this context to emphasize that in our LVF/RH data,
literal primes had facilitative effects that were additive with effects of metaphor
conventionality rather than competitive. Moreover, in direct tests, Thibodeau
and Durgin (2008; 2009, in press) have not found evidence of inhibitory costs
on metaphor comprehension time in alternative-sense metaphor contexts
compared to literal contexts.
If we are correct to interpret the effects of the alternative-sense primes in
the RH as re-aligning RH activity in a way that eliminated the RH benefits of
target sense conventionality, then the appropriate conclusion is that the
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comparison process is highly flexible: Advantages that would otherwise accrue
to the target metaphor as a result of its present career status were effectively
nullified by the recent processing of its alternative-sense competitor. This
representational flexibility seems desirable for the comprehension of extended
novel metaphors.
In the LH the main finding was that there was essentially no interference
produced by alternative-sense primes, whereas there was facilitation from
matched-sense primes. This is consistent with the idea that LH processing has
finer semantic fields (Jung-Beeman, 2005), but also with ideas concerned with
better prefrontal control of semantic activation in the LH (Thompson-Schill,
D’Esposito & Kan, 1999). Whatever the mechanism, the LH seems to maintain a
remarkably precise target metaphor sense.
Finally, with respect to the comparison process itself, the coarse coding
model seems to be generally supported by the present results: In the RH, we
saw facilitation of metaphorical processing from literal primes as well as from
competing metaphorical primes. However, coarse coding does not appear to
supply, on its own, an explanation of analogical comparison processes
necessary for novel metaphor comprehension. The present data merely suggest
that the coding in the right hemisphere is flexible, such that different sorts of
structural alignments may be more or less readily available under various
interpretive contexts. A more developed theory may need to appeal to a process
of constraint satisfaction (e.g., Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Hummel & Holyoak,
1997, 2003; McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986). Specifically, given overlap
across coarse-grained semantic fields, structural alignment might arise by
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subjecting the activation patterns that emerge to principles of satisfaction of
multiple constraints.
Our study has been framed in the terms of the Career of Metaphor
hypothesis (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), but our findings might be understood as
indicating that there are two levels at which careers unfold. In the longer timescale, there are the careers of metaphors in the language of a speaker or set of
speakers. With frequent use, metaphors become conventionalized categories, as
represented by the overwhelming relationship between target conventionality
and target comprehension speed in our data. (See Thibodeau and Durgin, in
press, for a fuller discussion of the measurement of conventionality.) But in the
short term, sensitivity to the use of repeated or extended metaphor also clearly
plays an important role in facilitating comprehension, and it is this flexibility
and context dependence, even in the face of highly conventionalized metaphors
that lends productive power to metaphoric speech.
The principal goal of the present study has not been to precisely localize
metaphor-processing function, but to examine lateralized processes of
comparison and categorization. We have shown that conventional metaphors
seemed to lose their advantage in the RH when the “career” of a competing
alternative metaphoric meaning of the same word had been recently “advanced”
by priming. We take this as an indication of the flexibility of metaphor
processing in the RH.
Whereas prior results concerning the lateralization of metaphor
processing have been mixed (see Coulson, 2008), our results are consistent
with the idea that something like novelty or salience (Giora, 1997; Giora &
Stringaris, 2009; Mashal & Faust, 2009) rather than metaphoricity per se
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(Schmidt et al., 2009) determines the type (and possibly the neural location) of
processing that is engaged. Studies that use conventional metaphors with
salient metaphoric senses are unlikely to observe the same patterns of
processing as studies that choose metaphor senses with lower salience. But
even studies using novel metaphor sentences have sometimes reported greater
activation in the LH (e.g., Mashal, Faust, Hendler & Jung-Beeman, 2009; Rapp et
al., 2007). We expect that some of the discrepancies that appear in the
literature on lateralization may be traced back to methodological issues. The
processing requirements of the specific behavioral task chosen may be as
important as the selection of the metaphor stimuli themselves.
One of the hallmarks of metaphoric speech is its productivity. Extended
metaphors are an efficient and compelling rhetorical device for persuasion via
the communication of a particular framing of a topic of discussion (Thibodeau,
McClelland & Boroditsky, 2009). Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) showed that
when even highly conventionalized metaphors are used consistently, the
comprehension of novel extensions of their literal imagery is facilitated. Of
course, it is not unusual for people to mix common metaphors inadvertently
because they are so transparent in their meaning. Our results suggest that the
subtle effects of mixed metaphors on comprehension may be most evident
when the LVF/RH is probed.
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Appendix A: Target and Prime Sentences.
Note that these are ordered here according to the rated conventionality of the metaphoric sense
of the vehicle in the target sentence.

Sentence Type

Stimulus

Target

That bedroom is a dump.

Matched-Sense

This kitchen is a dump.

Conventionalitya

My office is a dump.
Alternative-Sense

1.119

2.166

6.56

0.196

5.21

That toilet is a dump.
A cesspool is a dump.

Literal Primes

Similarityb

A landfill is a dump.
The trash heap is a dump.

Target

Some fashion models are twigs.

Matched-Sense

Some math nerds are twigs.
A greyhound is a twig.

Alternative-Sense

0.325

4.83

-0.512

3.29

My old bones are twigs.
Egg shells are twigs.

Literal Primes

1.091

A piece of kindling is a twig.
Small branches are twigs.

Target

Some teachers are encyclopedias.

Matched-Sense

Some game show contestants are encyclopedias.
A history buff is an encyclopedia.

Alternative-Sense

0.759

6.79

0.095

4.06

A phone book is an encyclopedia.
An epic poem is an encyclopedia.

Literal Primes

0.816

Wikipedia is an encyclopedia.
Some book sets are encyclopedias.

Target

Alcohol is a crutch.

0.740

37
Mixing Metaphors in the Hemispheres
Matched-Sense

A mortgage is a crutch.
Drug use is a crutch.

Alternative-Sense

5.67

-1.492

2.21

The Parthenon’s columns are crutches.
A wide bookshelf is a crutch.

Literal Primes

1.261

A cane is a crutch.
A wooden brace is a crutch.

Target

Faith is an anchor.

Matched-Sense

A friend is an anchor.
My goal is an anchor.

Alternative-Sense

1.029

6.44

-0.726

2.28

A broken leg is an anchor.
My debt is an anchor.

Literal Primes

0.723

A ship’s brake is an anchor.
Some iron weights are anchors.

Target

A senator is a fossil.

Matched-Sense

The bottle of wine is a fossil.
A classic movie is a fossil.

Alternative-Sense

0.457

4.11

-0.562

4.42

Those crackers are fossils.
The beef jerky is a fossil.

Literal Primes

0.585

Dinosaur bones are fossils.
Petrified wood is a fossil.

Target

Ideas can be diamonds.

Matched-Sense

Paintings can be diamonds.
Some jokes are diamonds.

Alternative-Sense

0.607

5.72

-0.980

2.79

Steel beams are diamonds.
My cast is a diamond.

Literal Primes

0.528

Some necklaces are diamond.
An expensive jewel is a diamond.
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Target

His marriage was a leash.

Matched-Sense

Her daily chores were a leash.
A nine-to-five weekday job is a leash.

Alternative-Sense

0.665

6.11

-0.999

2.57

A pony-tail is a leash.
That kid’s headphone wire is a leash.

Literal Primes

0.433

A dog guide is a leash.
Some ropes are leashes.

Target

Jalepeno Peppers are fire.

Matched-Sense

Taco sauce is fire.
Raw onions are fire.

Alternative-Sense

0.386

6.79

0.531

4.00

Fresh pizza is fire.
The sun today is fire.

Literal Primes

0.424

The flickering light is fire.
A cooking element is fire.

Target

His college class is a zoo

Matched-Sense

Sometimes Times Square is a zoo.
My child’s day care center is a zoo.

Alternative-Sense

0.145

6.64

1.571

5.06

The used car lot was a zoo.
The professor’s bookshelf was a zoo.

Literal Primes

0.399

His animal collection is a zoo.
Some lions live in a zoo.

Target

Some marriages are storms.

Matched-Sense

The presidential debate was a storm.
Some business partnerships are storms.

Alternative-Sense

0.388

0.431

5.39

0.028

3.43

Some runningbacks are storms.
Her mind is a storm.
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Literal Primes

A tornado is a storm.
A downpour is a storm.

Target

Her ex-husband is a gem.

Matched-Sense

A great job is a gem.
His little daughter is a gem.

Alternative-Sense

0.374

4.36

0.431

3.28

The lake’s surface is a gem.
The office building’s facade is a gem.

Literal Primes

0.355

A ruby is a gem.
An emerald is a gem.

Target

My Grandfather’s legs are steel

Matched-Sense

A bouncer’s arms are steel.
That football player’s neck is steel.

Alternative-Sense

1.376

4.89

-0.049

4.57

The meditating monk was steel.
His face was steel.

Literal Primes

0.154

Some tableware is steel.
An industrial material is steel.

Target

An insult is a razor.

Matched-Sense

A betrayal is a razor.
Needless criticism is a razor.

Alternative-Sense

-0.057

6.35

0.990

3.17

A genius’ mind is a razor.
Her memory is a razor.

Literal Primes

0.150

A scalpel is a razor.
Gillette shavers are razors .

Target

A lie is a dagger.

Matched-Sense

Losing a loved one is a dagger.
Some breakups are daggers.

0.113

0.024

5.78
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Alternative-Sense

The silent shot was a dagger.
The quick jab was a dagger.

Literal Primes

0.969

4.22

A short knife is a dagger.
Some weapons are daggers.

Target

My rat’s fur is silk.

Matched-Sense

A pig’s fur is silk.
The snake’s skin is silk.

Alternative-Sense

0.023

5.83

-0.084

5.43

A baby’s bottom is silk.
My father’s bald head is silk.

Literal Primes

0.089

A chinese fabric is silk.
A product of worms is silk.

Target

Education is a lantern.

Matched-Sense

A how-to book is a lantern.
My mentor is a lantern.

Alternative-Sense

-0.986

5.86

-1.062

2.00

An excited dog’s tail is a lantern.
A swing is a lantern.

Literal Primes

-0.008

That light is a lantern.
Some oil-lamps are lanterns.

Target

My boyfriend is a peach.

Matched-Sense

Some grandmothers are peaches.
The baby is a peach.

Alternative-Sense

-0.731

6.07

-0.598

1.94

Some dog fur is a peach.
My blanket is a peach.

Literal Primes

-0.050

A sweet fruit is a peach.
A candy flavor is peach.

Target

Her personality is a mirror.

-0.133
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Matched-Sense

Some artists are mirrors.
Introspection is a mirror.

Alternative-Sense

4.29

0.469

3.11

Some twins are mirrors.
The 2008 and 2009 models are mirrors.

Literal Primes

-0.188

A dark window is a mirror.
Some beauty tools are mirrors.

Target

A beaver is a lumberjack.

Matched-Sense

A chainsaw is a lumberjack.
Those termites are lumberjacks.

Alternative-Sense

-0.855

6.29

-0.321

2.22

A gladiator is a lumberjack.
Some wrestlers are lumberjacks.

Literal Primes

-0.150

Paul Bunyan was a lumberjack.
A logger is a lumberjack.

Target

Some snores are sirens.

Matched-Sense

Some whistles are sirens.
This applause is a siren.

Alternative-Sense

0.250

4.67

-0.967

3.71

The news release was a siren.
An advertisement is a siren.

Literal Primes

-0.204

That horn is a siren.
Some alarms are sirens.

Target

A zoo is a museum.

Matched-Sense

A library is a museum.
His photograph collection is a museum.

Alternative-Sense

0.598

5.36

0.586

3.72

My grandmother’s jewel box is a museum.
A nursing home is a museum.

Literal Primes

-0.238

The Smithsonian is a museum.
A sculpture garden is a museum

42
Mixing Metaphors in the Hemispheres

Target

That advertisement was a sermon.

Matched-Sense

Conversation with my father is a sermon.
Public health announcements are sermons.

Alternative-Sense

0.027

5.79

-0.495

3.89

Textbook reading is a sermon.
Attendance roll calls are sermons.

Literal Primes

-0.273

A preacher’s speech is a sermon.
Some moralizing discussions are sermons.

Target

An intelligent student is a warehouse.

Matched-Sense

A hard drive is a warehouse.
My car trunk is a warehouse.

Alternative-Sense

0.378

4.11

-0.430

2.57

The library's exterior was a warehouse.
The apartment complex was a warehouse.

Literal Primes

-0.472

A storage facility is a warehouse.
Home Depot is a warehouse

Target

Hostility is a veil.

Matched-Sense

A curtain is a veil.
The clouds are a veil.

Alternative-Sense

0.426

4.07

-0.341

2.56

A tissue is a veil.
Thin socks are a veil.

Literal Primes

-0.500

That white cloth is a veil.
Some masks are veils.

Target

The moon is a pie.

Matched-Sense

Some faces are pies.
My cat’s belly is a pie.

Alternative-Sense

-0.510

-0.961

3.67

-1.673

2.71

Some temperaments are pies.
A smile is a pie.
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Literal Primes

All tarts are pies.
Some desserts are pies.

Target

A cocaine habit is a bomb.

Matched-Sense

Highway speeding is a bomb.
Running with scissors is a bomb.

Alternative-Sense

-1.198

5.36

0.782

3.72

The spiteful political ad was a bomb.
The critique of my paper was a bomb.

Literal Primes

-0.611

A grenade is a bomb.
Land mines are bombs.

Target

Sadness is a volcano.

Matched-Sense

Anger is a volcano.
Political unrest is a volcano.

Alternative-Sense

1.437

3.89

-0.687

2.21

A chimney is a volcano.
Steam engines are volcanoes.

Literal Primes

-0.851

A hole in the earth’s crust is a volcano.
Mt. Vesuvius is a volcano

Target

My family is a raft

Matched-Sense

Sometimes work is a raft.
An enduring tradition is raft.

Alternative-Sense

-0.661

4.44

-1.252

2.86

That old house is a raft.
Some future plans are rafts.

Literal Primes

-0.916

That boat is a raft.
A canoe is a raft.

Target

Grandparents can be donkeys.

Matched-Sense

That bureaucrat is a donkey.
Some politicians are donkeys.

-1.019

0.713

3.72

44
Mixing Metaphors in the Hemispheres
Alternative-Sense

Some taxi drivers are donkeys.
The D student was a donkey.

Literal Primes

-0.778

4.50

Eeyore is a donkey.
A farm animal is a donkey

Target

The good news was an earthquake.

Matched-Sense

The opposition’s election was an earthquake.
The underdog victory is an earthquake.

Alternative-Sense

-1.072

-1.195

4.57

0.845

4.00

The stock market crash was an earthquake.
My brother’s death was an earthquake.

Literal Primes

Those vibrations are an earthquake.
A natural disaster is an earthquake.

Target

Some hairlines are clocks.

Matched-Sense

The general’s scars are a clock.
A tree’s rings are a clock.

Alternative-Sense

-1.048

4.50

-0.464

2.67

Your episodes are a clock.
The ocean’s waves are a clock.

Literal Primes

-1.099

Some pendants are clocks.
A wristwatch is a clock.

a Z-score of “not unusual” and “familiar” metaphoric sense ratings
b Mean rating of similarity with the target vehicle’s metaphoric sense (1-7 scale)
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Appendix B. Filler sentences, practice sentences, and their intended responses

Filler sentence

Intended response

A salesman is a worm

Y

A lake is a worm

N

The skirt is a squirrel

N

The animal is a squirrel

Y

A television is a radio

N

A pair of jeans is clothing

Y

Searching for happiness is a cardgame

Y

Elementary school is a garden

Y

A museum is a garden

Y

Electricity is a garden

N

The ant hill is a garden

N

A shark is a wart

N

That rug is a wart

N

That bump is a wart

Y

Some tumors are warts

Y

Some sons are tigers

Y

The beast is a tiger

Y

A couch is a tiger

N

Knowledge is a fortress

Y

Masonry is a fortress

N

Fresh drinking water is a fortress

N

Euclidean geometry is a tart

N

The philosopher's stone is a tart

N

The rhubarb pastry is a tart

Y

The congressman is a rat

Y

A critter is a rat

Y

Gas is a computer

N
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Some machines are computers

Y

The supermarket clerk was a slug

Y

Some pears are slugs

N

All my days are clouds

Y

Birth is a kraken

N

The shack on the corner is a home

Y

My linguistics midterm was a stroll

Y

Life's vicissitudes are a stroll

Y

Bottled water is a stroll

N

A good mug is a stroll

N

A simple education is a cart

N

True love is a cart

N

Some child's toys are carts

Y

My favorite vehicle is a cart

Y

Some merchants are wolves

Y

A stone is a wolf

N

Some canines are wolves

Y

Her ideas are gold

Y

The puffy billow is gold

N

Dulled vision is gold

N

A Portobello is a mushroom

Y

Some minidiscs are mushrooms

N

A printout is a mushroom

N

That amateur dancer is a cow

Y

That spotted beast is a cow

Y

That mango is a leech

N

My in-laws are leeches

Y

Risk is a game

Y

A Pepper is a game

N

A younger sibling is a stain

Y
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Murder is a spice

N

A Maglite is a flashlight

Y

The job market is a forest

Y

The American legal system is a forest

Y

Tyrannosaurus Rex is a forest

N

The gentleman's chivalry is a forest

N

My coffee is a zombie

N

Stereo speakers are zombies

N

Some braineaters are zombies

Y

The undead lowlife are zombies

Y

His grin is plastic

Y

Some pools are plastic

Y

Java beans are plastic

N

Their words were firearms

Y

Alzheimer's disease is a firearm

N

Most janitors are firearms

N

The science fair is a grill

N

Hard work is a grill

N

An open burner is a grill

Y

That politician is a skunk

Y

That odor is a skunk

Y

A promise is a web

Y

Courage is a web

N

This biscuit is a doctor

N

A pediatrician is a doctor

Y

My drug dealer is a shark

Y

Some sculptures are paintings

N

A trashcan is a container

Y
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Practice sentence

Intended response

My Latin teacher is a corpse

Y

That old dog is a corpse

Y

Strong dictators are corpses

N

A desktop is a corpse

N

Transparency is a laptop

N

Warm soup is a laptop

N

A common student possession is a laptop

Y

Portable computers are laptops

Y

Some ideologies are prisons

Y

An ostrich is a prison

N

Some edifices are prisons

Y

All my friends are vampires

Y

A California wine is a vampire

N

Beethoven's 3rd symphony is a vampire

N

National security is a turtle

N

Some happiness is a turtle

N

A cute pet is a turtle

Y

My office is a playground

Y

A space for children is a playground

Y

A baby is a sponge

Y

A lightswitch is a sponge

N

Driving home is a drug

N

Heroin is a drug

Y

The invaders' arrival was a flood

Y

A zipper is a button

N

Patience is a virtue

Y

Some bladders are barrels

Y

Some stomachs are barrels

Y

My pickup truck is a barrel

Y
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Some dogs are princesses

Y

A king's daughter is a princess

Y

Some fairy tale heroines are princesses

Y

A basket weaver is a spider

Y

A hunter is a spider

Y

A poacher is a spider

Y

Life is an open_book

Y

